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Toward a Contractarian Account of Family Governance
Marsha Garrison*
When family members make decisions, they often engage in acts of governance.
The terms and conditions of family governance are embodied in family law, which
lays out a kind of "constitution" delimiting the offices, powers, and rights of
individual family members.
In this paper I want to explore the topic of family governance from several
substantive perspectives. First, I will sketch some ways in which governance issues
can illuminate family law issues; I will argue that governance norms can be used both
to develop the links between seemingly disparate areas of family law and to provide
a basis for evaluating legislation and judicial decisions. Second, I will argue that, as
a result of the rapidity with which many areas of family law have recently changed,
the governance model embedded in contemporary family law contains a significant
number of gaps and inconsistencies. Finally, I will sketch one possible approach to
developing a fairly full account of family governance appropriate for today's families.
The approach I will employ is derived from the contractarian tradition developed
by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau and recently reinvigorated by John Rawls. The
contractarian methodology offers a well-developed and still vital tradition that
underlies many of our social and political institutions. Because it relies on the self-
interested decisions of autonomous individuals as a basis for the development of
societal institutions, the methodology is highly compatible with our current tendency
to view the family as a set of relationships based on voluntary association as well as
status. It can also be utilized to develop a detailed account of governance norms.
I should stress that my thoughts on all the issues presented in the paper are
tentative. My aim is not to lay out a fully developed program, but instead to outline
one possible approach and spur more thinking on this important topic.
I. THE NATURE OF FAMILY GOVERNANCE
Governance describes the functions and powers of actors within an established
system of political administration. Governance is not confined to the state, of course;
private organizations typically have governments to manage their internal affairs as
well. The methods of governance vary just as widely as do the entities that employ
them. Both despotism and constitutional democracy are forms of governance;
government officials may conduct business in accordance with established rules and
procedures or, if so empowered by their offices, may act on the basis of whim and
caprice.
Despite the range and variability of governments, we do not typically think of
family decision making as governmental. But Mom's announcement "Bedtime!" or
'Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Research for the Article was supported by the Brooklyn
Law School's Faculty Research Fund.
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Dad's purchase of a new car over Mom's objection nonetheless are governmental, in
the sense that Mom's and Dad's acts represent the exercise of power or authority
based on official status. Mom is empowered by law to prescribe certain rules of
conduct, including bedtime, for the youthful members of her family.' Assuming that
Mom and Dad live in a common law property jurisdiction and the funds for the car
are derived from Dad's income, Dad is empowered by law to decide how those funds
will be spent.2
Family decision makers tax, spend, make rules, and sanction misbehavior; their
powers are defined by their offices or status; their authority is backed by the force of
the state. The family thus functions differently than an ad hoc entity like a group of
friends planning a picnic. These friends must agree on the terms of their enterprise.
None can bind or set rules to govern the conduct of another. All may abandon the
enterprise for any reason and at any time.
Many other private groups--churches, clubs, schools, community organiza-
tions-have governments.3 Their governmental authorities, like those of the family,
will typically have the power to tax, spend, make rules, and sanction misbehavior. But
while family members have state-defined powers and entitlements, members of these
other organizations generally do not. The authority of their officers is not typically
backed by the force of the state;4 the offices, powers, and conditions for entry into and
exit from these organizations are not typically state-prescribed.5
Family governance thus represents a perhaps unique blend of tradition-based and
state-defined prerogatives. Although the family may well be the most intimate and
private of associations, the terms of its governance rest to a substantial extent on
public prescription.6
'Mom is also empowered by tradition, of course. The Supreme Court has declared that "[it] is
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); accord, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,400 (1923); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). But the state both enhances and limits tradition-based
parental authority. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 170-71 (upholding parental conviction understate child labor
laws).
2See LESLIE J. HARRIS Er AL., FAMILY LAW 8-13 (1996) (describing common law property system);
HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN TEE UNrED STATES 286-99 (2d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter CLARK (2d ed.)] (describing legal position of married women).
3See LON L FtJuER, TE MORALrrY OF LAw 125 (rev. ed. 1969) (describing college rules as "legal
system in miniature").
4Challenges to decisions of these entities may be subject to judicial review. See Comment, Private
Government on Campus-Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 passim (1963).5For example, the Supreme Court has held that genuinely private clubs and organizations may
discriminate in a way that would be illegal by a public entity. See Moose Lodge #107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163, 171-73 (1972).6See MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOcIETY 334-37 (Max Rheinstein ed., Simon &
Schuster 1967) (describing methods of domination through organization and sources of leaders'
legitimacy).
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II. FAMILY GOVERNANCE AND FAMILY LAW
Family law sets out the terms on which family governance is exercised. Family
law is thus "constitutional," in that it prescribes a "Bill of Rights" for individual
family members, the authority of family decision makers, the procedures for
overturning "illegal" decisions by those decision makers, and even the grounds upon
which the decision makers may be removed from "office."7 The result is that family
governance is neither anarchic nor despotic; it is bound by the rule of law.
We do not usually think of family law in these terms. What does this alternate
view add to our more commonplace understanding of the family and family law?
A. Governance and the Structure of Family Law
First, a focus on family governance can illuminate linkages between seemingly
disparate areas of family law. Consider the advent of no-fault divorce and abortion
rights during the 1960s and 70s. At first glance, these legal developments appear
unrelated; in our own country, indeed, one derived from widespread legislative
activity at the state level' and the other from a constitutional pronouncementf But
they do, in fact, share common roots: Both reflect a deep shift in the prevailing model
of family governance.
One clue to the linkage is timing. In 1965, no American state or European nation
offered either divorce or abortion on demand; by 1985, virtually all did, at least in
some circumstances." This is a remarkable shift both in its speed and scope. The two
developments are also similar in that, in each case, the enactment of new laws was
preceded by a lengthy period in which evasion of the formal law was widespread and
aided by the collusion of professionals (lawyers with respect to divorce, doctors with
respect to abortion)."
7Divorce law sets out the grounds for spouses; laws governing abuse, neglect, termination of parental
rights, and emancipation set out the grounds for loss of parental "office."
8For historical accounts of the move to no-fault divorce, see HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNrrED STATES passim (1988); Lawrence M. Friedman,
Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L REV. 649,664-69 (1984); Herma
Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CINN. L
REV. 1,4-15 (1987).
9See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
'See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN FAILURES,
EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 14 tbl. 1,168 tbl. 2 (1987) (categorizing abortion and divorce laws respectively,
with dates of enactment).
"The classic accounts of collusive practices in divorce law are Richard H. Wels, New York The
Poor Man's Reno, 35 CORNELLLQ. 303 passim (1950); Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce and the
New York Anomaly, 36 COLUM. L REV. 1121 passim (1936). For accounts of collusive practices
concerning abortion, see GLENDON, supra note 10, at 12; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF
ABSOLUTES 34-35 (1990).
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Both abortion and divorce represent a means of exit from an unwanted family
tie. The former rules demanded a socially acceptable reason for such an exit; 2 the
newer rules do not. 3 Legal developments in both areas of law are thus "pro-choice"
in the sense that they enhance the personal freedom of individual family members at
the expense of group ties.
Professor Mary Ann Glendon has argued that changes in abortion and divorce
law (or at least their American variants) were linked by a common de-emphasis of
family responsibility and obligation. 14 (Glendon's focus on these two legal reforms is,
of course, one of the reasons I have chosen them as examples.) But when viewed as
part of a larger set of changes in family law, an emphasis on individual autonomy is
more evident than is a de-emphasis of family responsibility. For example, during the
same time period that reforms in abortion and divorce law took place, "psychological
parenting" theory produced a new willingness to prefer the child's functional
relationships over those based on legal status" and a range of enactments enhanced
the likelihood of effective child support enforcement. 6 Neither of these reforms can
easily be characterized as anti-responsibility; indeed, both focus on the satisfaction
"Prior to abortion liberalization, most jurisdictions permitted abortion when necessary to preserve
the mother's life. See GLENDON, supra note 10, at 11-12. Prior to no-fault divorce, divorce was available
only when a ground for fault existed. Adultery was universally a ground; abandonment and cruelty were
typically grounds as well. For a discussion of the historical evolution from fault-based to no-fault divorce,
see, for example, CLARK (2d ed.), supra note 2, at 405-11; HARRIS ET AL. supra note 2, at 272-313.
31t is also possible that the shift in legal standards represents a new social consensus, but, at least
for abortion, public opinion suggests otherwise.
14See GLENDON, supra note 10, at 58 ("Our [American abortion] law stresses autonomy, separation,
and isolation in the war of all against all.'); see also id. at 108 ("The American story about marriage, as
told in the law and in much popular literature, goes something like this: marriage is a relationship that
exists primarily for the fulfillment of the individual spouses.").
'*The phrase "psychological parent" was apparently coined by Anna Freud, Joseph Goldstein, and
Albert J. Solnit, whose works BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF TIE CHILD (1973) and BEFORE THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979) did much to spur courts and legislatures in the direction of a functional
approach to parenthood. For examples of legal cornmentary using a psychological parenting approach, see,
for example, Katherine Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE LJ. 293, 313-15 (1988) [hereinafter
Bartlett, Parenthood] (arguing for custody decision making based on assessment of which connections
between parent and child are most important); Katherine Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive
Status: The Needfor Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L.
REV. 879, 882 (1984) ("[T]he child's need for continuity in intimate relationships demands that the state
provide the opportunity to maintain important familial relationships with more than one parent or set of
parents.") (internal citations omitted); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78
GEO. LJ. 459, 464 (1990) (proposing "expanding the definition of parenthood to include anyone who
maintains a functional parental relationship with a child when a legally recognized parent created that
relationship with the intent that the relationship be parental in nature"); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDoZo L REv. 1747, 1758
(1993) (arguing in favor of functional definition of parenthood).
"tFor an overview of child support initiatives over the past 20 years, see Lowell H. Lima & Robert
C. Harris, The Child Support Enforcement Program in the United States, in CHILD SUPPORT: FROM DEBT
COLLECTION TO SocIAL PouCY 20 (Alfred J. Kahn & Sheila J. Kamerman eds., 1988); Paul K. Legler, The
Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the 1996 Welfare Act, 30 FAM. LQ. 519
(1996).
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of responsibilities as a precondition for exercising rights. 7 Abortion reform, no-fault
divorce, and many of the other reforms of this era thus evidence a new, generalized
emphasis on individual autonomy within the family. The new emphasis on the
autonomy of family members reflects a long-term shift away from authoritarian family
governance norms. Return, momentarily, to the late taghteenth century when our own
constitutional republic was founded. Under the common law of that period, the
husband and father of the family was legally entitled to proclaim, with Louis XIV,
that "l'dtat, c'est moi:"
When a woman married, her identity was swallowed up in her husband's. As William
Blackstone pithily put it in the eighteenth century, summing up the thrust of English
common law, "The husband and wife are one, and the husband ii that one." What this
meant was that, with a few exceptions, a wife could not bring a legal action in a court,
make a contract, or own property. If she technically had title to property, it was controlled
by her husband....
The law assumed, furthermore, that the husband as the ruler of the household had the
right to use discipline to enforce his rule. In this respect, wives were subjects of the same
loving despotism as servants and children. There were laws all over Europe giving men
the right to beat their wives.... Abuse and cruelty were always frowned on, but a man
was expected to do what he had to in order to be obeyed .... .
Authoritarian patriarchy began to give way during the nineteenth century with
the enactment of the Married Women's Property Acts, statutory divorce laws, child
and spousal support obligations. 9 By the late nineteenth century, paternal authority
had also been circumscribed by laws dealing with child labor, education, and
neglect.'3 The husband and father retained his role as head of the family and primary
7See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,262 (1983) (stating that biological parenthood confers
only "opportunity ... to develop a relationship .... If [the parent] grasps that opportunity and accepts
some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may... make uniquely valuable contributions to
the child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State
to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie."); Guardianship of Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr.
781, 788-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 158 (Iowa 1966) (awarding
custody of child to grandparents rather than father because grandparents offered more stability and
security).
"BEATRICE GOTTLIEB, THE FAMILY IN THE WESTERN WORLD: FROM THE BLACK DEATH TO THE
INDUSTRIAL AGE 91 (1993).
"'For historical accounts of the alteration in married women's rights, see, for example, CARL N.
DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT
(1980); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAw AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA (1985); ELJTABETH B. WARBASE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 1800-61
(1987); Richard Chused, Married Women's Propeny Law: 1800-1850,71 GEO. LJ. 1359 (1983). For an
historical account of the changing role of women in the family, see HoUSEHOLD CONSTITUTION AND
FAMILY REiATIONSHIPS (Nancy F. Cott ed., 1992).
"A detailed account of these developments, utilizing a variety of original sources, is contained in
CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Robert H. Bremner ed. 1971). See also
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS
ON CHILDREN AND THE LAw 916-21,926-36 (3d ed. 1995) (summarizing development of compulsory
education and child labor laws); Steven Mintz, Children, Families, and the State: American Family Law
in Historical Perspective, 69 DENV. U. L REv. 635 (1992) (describing shifts in legal rules relating to
children).
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decision maker, but his powers were now limited by laws that mandated support for
other family members and set boundaries on the exercise of his authority.
This new governance model was reciprocal; the obligations of wife and children
to the family patriarch were contingent on the proper exercise of his authority. The
patriarch who committed adultery could lose his wife (but still be required to support
her); the patriarch who abused his children could lose them to the state (but still bear
responsibility for their support). Conversely, wife and child risked losing their support
entitlements unless they complied with the patriarch's reasonable commands."' While
reciprocal, governance under this model was not democratic. The family patriarch
was entitled to select the domicile of other family members;' family immunities, that
denied individual family members the right to maintain a tort action against another,
also survived intact.2' But the legal identities of individual family members were no
longer submerged in that of the patriarch. And individual obligations to the patriarch
were conditioned on fulfillment of his obligations to them. Despotism, in short, had
evolved into constitutional monarchy.
A range of legal developments dating from the 1960s and 70s reflects yet
another evolution in governance: Constitutional monarchy has begun to give way to
a more democratic and egalitarian governance model. The new model does not rely
on sex-based roles and obligations or emphasize the inviolability of family ties.
Instead, it relies on gender-neutral rules and obligations; it "emphasize[s] the
individuality of the members of the conjugal family as well [as] ... facilitat[ing] their
independence from it and each other."'24 The new governance model links develop-
ments as diverse as abortion reform, no-fault divorce, abandonment of the "tender
years" presumption in custody law,' a more functional definition of parenthood, and
2 See, e.g., HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
331-34,445-46 (lst ed. 1968) [hereinafter CLARK (1st ed.)] (describing restrictions on wife's alimony
right); 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 56 (1978) (describing restrictions on child's support right).
22See CLARK (1st ed.), supra note 21, at 150 ("When she marries, the wife normally takes the
husband's domicile automatically in place of her previous domicile of choice. So long as they live together
she continues to have his domicile.") (internal citations omitted).
'As late as 1968, the author of a leading family law treatise reported that only 17 states had
abolished spousal immunity, and that, while "one might suppose that other states would join the chorus
and discard the immunity, this does not seem to be happening." Id. at 254.
2MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEw FAMILY AND THE NEw PROPERTY 245 (1981).
'
5Under the common law, the father of a child was entitled to custody. Blackstone held that the
mother was "entitled to no power [over her children], but only to reverence and respect." 1 WILIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND *453.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, "growing concern with child nurture and the acceptance
of women as more legally distinct individuals, ones with a special capacity for moral and religious
leadership and for child rearing, undermined the primacy of paternal custody rights...." GROSSBERG,
supra note 19, at 239. By the late nineteenth century, American courts universally awarded custody based
on the "best interests of the child," augmented by the "tender years doctrine," which established a
rebuttable presumption that a young child belonged with its mother. See generally MARY ANN MASON,
FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1994).
While the tender years doctrine survived in all jurisdictions until the 1960s and in some until
considerably later, courts and legislatures have now universally moved toward a gender-neutral application
of the best interests standard. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377, 1383 (D.C. 1978); Ex Parte
Devine, 398 So.2d. 686, 695 (Ala. 1981) (holding tender years presumption impermissibly discriminates
between fathers and mothers in child custody on the basis of sex); Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah
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a children's rights movemenf-links that are extremely difficult to discern unless we
focus on governance issues.
B. Governance Norms as a Means of Evaluating
Family Law Rules and Decisions
When we see a governmental constitution lurking behind diverse family law
rules, we not only have a means of understanding legal reforms; we also have a means
of evaluating legislative enactments and judicial pronouncements. We can ask
whether they comport, or conflict, with the "constitution of the family."
Consider the well-known, and controversial, case of McGuire v. McGuire.'
Starkly put, Mr. McGuire was a miser who maintained strict control of the income
and capital within his control, refusing to buy basic necessities like indoor plumbing,
a car heater, and an electric refrigerator. Mrs. McGuire, who had walked into this
situation as a young widow with two minor children thirty-three years earlier, sued
Mr. McGuire for support. The trial court granted her the support she requested, but
the appellate court reversed, holding that, while Mr. McGuire did indeed have a legal
obligation to support his wife,
"[t]he living standards of a[n intact] family are a matter of concern to the
household, and not for the courts to determine, even though the husband's attitude
toward his wife, according to his wealth and circumstances, leaves little to be said
in his behalf. As long as the home is maintained and the parties are living as
husband and wife it may be said that the husband is supporting his wife .... Public
policy requires such a holding ... ,28
Much ink has been spilled over McGuire, most of it focused on whether public
policy does, in fact, require closing the courthouse door to members of an intact
family. Professor Teitelbaum, for one, has questioned the wisdom of denying Mrs.
McGuire her day in court, noting that "the practical consequence of ... the[]
decision[] is to confer or ratify the power of one family member over others" and
thus to "ratiffy] the naturally existing or socially created inequalities which have led
to the victory of one over the other."" Other commentators have approved the
McGuire holding, arguing, in Professor Hafen's words, that "constant legal
intervention (or the threat of it) will destroy the continuity that is critically necessary
for meaningful, ongoing relations and developmental nurturing" and that "increas[ing]
1986) (holding gender cannot be used as factor for determining custody).
'For an historical account of the movement, see Martha Minow, Children's Rights: Where We've
Been, and Where We're Going, 68 TEMPLE L REV. 1573 (1995).
27This account is based on the appellate opinion in McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb.
1953).
2IMcGuire, 59 N.W.2d at 342.
2'e E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L REV. 1135, 1174.
30d. at-1178.
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state intervention in an ongoing family to protect the autonomy of some family
members... may simply exchange one threat to autonomy for another."'"
In looking at this debate, it is important to note that Professors Teitelbaum and
Hafen probably agree on the propriety of state intervention in many, if not most,
cases. I doubt that Professor Teitelbaum would favor state intervention for disputes
about the division of the family's jelly beans or who washes the dishes;32 I doubt that
Professor Hafen would take cases involving assault, child abuse, or income and
property disputes within the separated family out of court in order to enhance familial
autonomy or developmental nurturing. McGuire is an interesting case because it
arouses disagreement rather than consensus; that disagreement stems, I suspect, from
a more fundamental disagreement over the structure of family governance.
Reconsider Professor Teitelbaum's claim that the "the practical consequence [of
the McGuire outcome] ... is to confer or ratify the power of one family member over
others"'33 and thus to "ratif[y] the naturally existing or socially created inequalities
which have led to the victory of one over the other."' Professor Teitelbaum is
undeniably right that this is the practical consequence of the McGuire decision."
What makes his claim appealing is the court's acceptance of Mrs. McGuire's
argument that she is entitled to reasonable support from her husband. If she has such
a legal right, should she not also have a legal remedy?
While the right-without-remedy issue is clearly part of what has aroused interest
in McGuire, the court's reluctance to help Mrs. McGuire does not appear to derive
from fear of state intervention's impact on either familial autonomy or developmental
nurturing. Instead, it seems rooted in the sheer number of Mrs. McGuires: those with
a heated car and indoor plumbing but no refrigerator; those with a refrigerator but no
car at all; and those with a refrigerator and heated car and indoor plumbing but an
outmoded wardrobe.
The court's unwillingness to grant Mrs. McGuire a remedy seems to stem, in
short, from the specter of the floodgates opened, those same floodgates that have led
courts to hold that schools have no duty to educate,3" the police no duty to protect the
3 Brce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAvis L REV. 865, 912 (1989); see also Mary
Ann Glendon, Power and Authority in the Family: New Legal Patterns as Reflections of Changing
Ideologies, 23 AM. J. COMP. LAW 1, 9-10 (1975).
'I also doubt that Professor Teitelbaum would wish to overturn the result in Planned Parenthood
of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-72 (1976), which denied a forum to a husband aggrieved
by his wife's decision to have an abortion.
3 Teitelbaum, supra note 29, at 1174.
341d. at 1178.
35it is important to keep in mind that the converse of Professor Teitelbaum's statement is also true.
Were the court to have intervened, it would have ratified Mrs. McGuire's socially (i.e., legally) conferred
power to demand support from her husband. Both through action and nonaction, the state supports the
power of some individuals within the family and fosters a particular allocation of decision making
authority, or model of family governance. Professor Teitelbaum's statement, facially neutral, masks a claim
that the court should have acted to enhance Mrs. McGuire's power instead of her husband's.
'See, e.g., Donohue v. Copiaque Union Free School Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1353-54 (N.Y. 1979);
Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
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public," parents no duty to supervise their children," and bystanders no duty to
rescue a fellow being in distress. 39 Courts do not want to hear such cases because of
the fear that they will be numerous, time consuming, and extremely difficult to resolve
in a fair and consistent manner. In each instance, it is hard to differentiate
nonremediable disputes from those that involve a justiciable legal claim."
Just as in the tort context, of course, it is possible, to fashion a rule that would
keep some disputes about family expenditure out of court and give entry to others.
That is, in fact, exactly what the McGuire court did. While denying a forum to Mrs.
McGuire, it explicitly affirmed the right of separated wives to a hearing; on support.41
And, while it did not directly address this possibility, the court was certainly aware
that, under the necessaries doctrine, Mrs. McGuire could have indirectly obtained a
hearing on support by purchasing the refrigerator and car heater using her husband's
credit42 These standards-separation and the purchase of necessaries-offer bright
line tests of serious support inadequacy, just as the rule permitting suit by a criminal
victim who has relied on the police for protection offers a means of identifying a
particularly egregious form of inadequate policing.43 The disagreement between
Professor Teitelbaum and the McGuire court thus comes down to whether this is the
correct line.
The disagreement between Professor Teitelbaum and the McGuire court is not,
of course, solely about the ease with which a different line might be drawn. Just as in
the tort context I alluded to a moment ago, the placement and brightness of the line
drawn will reflect a range of policy concerns-the foreseeability and degree of harm
to the plaintiff, the moral blame attached to defendant's conduct, the possibility of
preventing future harm.' But, ultimately, "it is all a question of fair judgment, always
keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor to make a rule in each case that will be
practical and in keeping with the general understanding of mankind."'45
I believe that the McGuire court was content with the line it drew because that
line was both practical and consistent with the "constitutional monarchy" model of
family governance embedded in the law of Nebraska, and most other American
'See Riss v. New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861 (N.Y. 1968).
38See Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Wis. 1963) (holding that children have no cause of
action against their parents for negligent supervision); Halodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346 (N.Y.
1974) (same). But see Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971) (holding that child may maintain
negligence action against parent).
39See Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1897); Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959);
see also WItiAm L PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 340-48 (4th ed. 1971).
'These claims can, of course, be exaggerated. For example, most European countries impose a duty
to rescue, as does the State of Vermont. Their courts have not been overwhelmed with nonjusticiable
disputes. Indeed, there is no evidence that the imposition of a duty to rescue produces much litigation.
41"As long as the home is maintained and the parties are living as husband and wife, it may be said
that the husband is legally supporting his wife." 59 N.W.2d at 342 (emphasis added).
42See CLARK (1st ed.), supra note 21, at 189-92 (describing necessaries doctrine).
4oSee, e.g., Schuster v. City of New York, 154 N.E.2d 534, 537 (N.Y. 1959); DeLongv. County of
Erie, 457 N.E.2d 717,722 (N.Y. 1983).
"See Rowland v. Christian, 433 P.2d 561,568 (Cal. 1968) (describing policy bases for decision
whether or not to impose duty in tort cases).
'Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, L, dissenting).
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jurisdictions, in 1953. Under this model, recall, Mr. McGuire was legally the head of
the household and had the right to determine the family's domicile and mode of living.
Mrs. McGuire was duty-bound to follow him and her refusal to do so without
sufficient excuse amounted to desertion.46 Mr. McGuire had a duty to support Mrs.
McGuire, but each spouse individually owned and managed his or her own income
and property;47 Mrs. McGuire would obtain a share (probably one-third) of Mr.
McGuire's estate at his death,€ but had no right of management or ownership during
his lifetime. Mrs. McGuire could leave her husband, but her desertion would give Mr.
McGuire grounds for divorce or separation and likely would deprive Mrs. McGuire
of her support right.49 Conversely, of course, Mrs. McGuire would have grounds for
divorce and could obtain support, in the form of alimony, if Mr. McGuire were to turn
her out of the houseO Neither spouse could obtain a divorce based on mere
inclination."'
The result in McGuire is fully consistent with this governance model. It
emphasizes male decision-making authority, individual property entitlements, and
marital continuity in the face of conflict. Professor Teitelbaum's critique of McGuire
fails to take account of the fact that the decision is altogether appropriate in light of
the then-current model of family governance.
C. Family Governance as Family Policy
My account of McGuire suggests a methodology for addressing a broader range
of substantive and procedural issues in family law: In choosing a result, we might
base our decision, at least in part, on the extent to which the possibilities are
consistent with the "constitution of the family." Just as they did in McGuire, practical
concerns must also play a role, but the prevailing model of family governance would
occupy an important, if not paramount, place in our analysis.
This methodological suggestion is not, of course, novel; there is widespread
agreement among family law scholars that the expression of contemporary values and
beliefs is one of family law's most important functions.52 Commentators have also
noted the desirability of an explicit family policy as a basis for specific legislative
'See CLARK (lst ed.), supra note 21, at 339 (stating that "if the wife refuses to live in the domicile
chosen by her husband, she is a deserter, unless the husband's choice is unreasonable or made in bad
faith").
'See ki. at 224-26 (describing Married Women's Property Acts). Mrs. McGuire could pledge her
husband's credit and force him to defend lawsuits brought by the plumber and furniture store under the
necessaries doctrine; he could not pledge her credit.
'For a description of spousal right of election laws, see, for example, JESSE DUKEMINIER &
STANLEY M. JOHANSEN, WiLS, TRUSrS AND ESTATES 483-84 (5th ed. 1995); LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER
ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAw 473-76 (1991).
49See CLARK (lst ed.), supra note 21, at 331-34, 445-46.
'See id. at 331-40.
5
'See supra note 10, and accompanying text.
"For recent analyses of the expressive function of family law, see, for example, MILTON C. REGAN,
JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PtRsurr OF INTIMACY 176-84 (1993); Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling
Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L REV. 495 (1992); Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions
of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L REv. 991 (1991).
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enactments.53 The McGuire court did not utilize the governance or policy-based
approach explicitly; but I think that at some level it did. I also suspect that Professor
Teitelbaum's comments on McGuire rely on a model of family governance; but it is
the more democratic model of which no-fault divorce and abortion rights are
exemplary that Professor Teitelbaum appears to have in mind.'
The trend in favor of democracy is now well-established, and certainly part of
the reason for the amount of ink spilled over McGuire-particularly the ink
suggesting that the court got it wrong-is that spousal equality is now widely seen as
desirable, but has not yet been fully established in either law or fact.55 Hence the
desire to grant Mrs. McGuire a forum in order to enhance her power and create
greater democracy within the McGuire family.
Does a democratic family governance model require granting Mrs. McGuire a
forum on support? This is, I think, what Professor Teitelbaum may ultimately be
suggesting. But it is not so easy to determine whether Professor Teitelbaum is right
or wrong. The first problem is that the support right on which Mrs. McGuire relied
derived from the underlying patriarchal governance structure. The family monarch
owed his subjects reasonable support in return for their respect and obedience;5"
53See JOHN DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT AND PERSONAL: THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE COURSE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 39 (1986) (stating that the United States "stands almost alone among Western
industrialized countries in having no coherent 'family policy"); Glendon, supra note 10, at 135
("[American] family policy is implicit, contained in the details of tax law... and so on. Because it is
implicit it is largely unexamined, and its implications for family life are insufficiently aired and
discussed."); id. at 142 ("[W]e need to make the effort to understand what the totality of our legal
regulations relating to family life is saying about our society and the way we view families, individuals,
human life, dependency and neediness in all its forms.").
"
4The substantive entitlements of individual spouses have shifted in accordance with this
democratization of family governance. Today, in most states, both spouses have support obligations and
may find their credit bound by the necessaries doctrine. See, e.g., Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v.
Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003, 1005 (NJ. 1980) (holding that "[b]oth spouses are liable for necessary
expenses incurred by either spouse in the course of marriage"); North Carolina Baptist Hosps., Inc. v.
Harris, 354 S.E.2d 471,474 (NC. 1987) (same). Some jurisdictions have imposed liability on the wife
only where the husband is unable to pay for his own necessaries. See, e.g., Borgess Med. Ctr. v. Smith, 386
N.W.2d 684, 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that wife is responsible for deceased husband's necessary
medical costs); Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 314 N.W.2d 326, 330-31 (Wis. 1982) (upholding rule
allowing creditor to collect for necessaries from wife, but only after first attempting to collect from
husband). Some states have also attained gender neutrality by abandoning the necessaries doctrine. See,
e.g., Condore v. Prince George's County, 425 A.2d 1011, 1019 (Md. 1981) (abolishing ancient necessaries
doctrine and finding neither husband nor wife liable for other's medical costs); Schilling v. Bedford County
Mer. Hosp., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 905,908 (Va. 1983) (same); see generally Margaret M. Mahoney, Economic
Sharing During Marriage: Equal Protection, Spousal Support, and the Doctrine of Necessaries, 22 J.
FAM. L 221 (1983-84).
'Husbands are more likely to dominate spending decisions; they are less likely, even when the wife
works full-time outside the home, to perform house work or child care. See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER
SCHWARTz, AMERICAN COUPLES 53-59,62-64; 144-46 (1983); ARLE HOcHSCHItD, THE SECOND SHIFr
216-20; 259-62 (1989); FRANCES .. GOLDSCHEIDER & LINDA J. WAITE, NEW FAMILIES, No FAMILIES?
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN HOME 107-23 (1991); JAN PAHL, MONEY AND MARRIAGE
(1989); Carole B. Burgoyne & Alan Lewis, Distributive Justice in Marriage: Equality or Equity?, 4 J.
COMM. &APP. SOC. PSYCH. 101 (1994).
"See CLARK (lst ed.), supra note 21, at 181 (describing traditional model and noting that "[s]ince
the remedies are usually indirect and since the rules only come into play when the marriage has broken
down, one could describe them as predictions of what courts will do on divorce or separation rather than
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nonpatriarchal, democratic governance must, of necessity, offer a different account
of Mrs. McGuire's entitlements.
The next difficulty is that the nature of Mrs. McGuire's entitlement in the
context of an egalitarian, democratic scheme of family governance is far from clear.
One vision of egalitarian democracy might emphasize marital community and thus
require joint ownership and management of family assets. But another might
emphasize individual autonomy with respect to income and property and thus
abandon or severely restrict support rights.' Equality and democracy are fuzzy ideals
that fail to specify how the autonomy of individuals within the family should be
balanced against the family's community interests. Given that deficiency, these ideals
cannot provide clear guidance on the substantive rules of law-with respect to
divorce, property, support, etc.-that channel family decision making.
The ideals of autonomy and community are both embedded in American family
law today and coexist in a state of uneasy tension. Changes in the law over the past
several decades evidence the pull of both and demonstrate no consistent preference
or ordering principle. The move to equal or equitable property distribution at divorce"
and the expansion of the spousal right of election 9 emphasize community. No-fault
divorce, on the other hand, emphasizes autonomy; so does the expansion of abortion
rights and the Supreme Court's rulings denying a husband the opportunity to contest
his wife's decision to have an abortion;' so do the new child support guidelines that
grant the payor parent a "self-support reserve."'"
as models of the well conducted marriage. But these rules acquire much of their force and vitality from the
fact that they construct a model of correct behavior. They are moral precepts.").
'For example, Professor Clark, criticizing the traditional patriarchal rules, argues that "[iln fact, the
husband should not have to support his wife at all if she has sufficient income either from earnings or
property to support herself adequately." Id. at 184. The McGuire court also notes Mrs. McGuire's "fairsized
bank account" and rents in denying her a forum on support. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d at 342.
nsSee, e.g., J. THOMAs OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBION OF PROPERTY 13-
8.1 n.9 (1997) (categorizing state property distribution rules). For descriptions of the historical
development of the equitable property distribution concept and the sources of its recent acceptance, see,
for example, Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable
Distribution Law Upon Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOKLYN L. REV. 621, 627-32 (1991); Mary Ann
Glendon, Property Rights Upon Dissolution of Marriages and Informal Unions, in THE CAMBRIDGE
LECrURES 245 (N. Eastham & B. Krivy eds., 1981).
-"All of the common law states except Georgia statutorily grant the surviving spouse an entitlement
to a share of the decedent spouse's property (typically the old dower fraction, one-third). See DUKEMINIER
& JOHANSON, supra note 48, at 483-84; WAGGONER Er AL, supra note 48, at 473 & n.1 1. Many states
have expanded the pool to which the right of election attaches to include a wide range of non-probate
property. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 48, at 510-12; WAGGONER El AL., supra note
48, at 479.
The 1990 revisions to the Uniform Probate Code go even further and establish an entitlement to one-
half of the "augmented estate" for a spouse married fifteen or more years. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 2. pt.
2, general comment (1990) (stating that UPC revisions were explicitly designed to "bring elective-share
law into line with the contemporary view of marriage as an economic partnership... applied in both the
common-law and community-property states when a marriage ends in divorce"); see also John H. Langbein
& Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share, 22 REAL PROP., PROBATE TR. J. 303,
304-14 (1987).
')See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
"'For a description of the self-support reserve, see infra note 123 and accompanying text.
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We could continue this exercise and, working inductively from diverse rules, try
to intuit the details of the governance model embedded in today's family law. But the
rules that we would utilize were adopted at different times and in piecemeal, issue-by-
issue fashion. Particularly in view of the rapidity with which family law has recently
evolved, we would have, in the end, a patchwork rather than a consistent framework.
This inductive approach to family governance is still a useful one; it can show
us where we are, and, by exposing the inconsistencies in our position, perhaps induce
refinement of our views. 62 But to resolve specific questions, like the forum issue in
McGuire, it would be desirable to have a fuller and clearer model of family
governance.
The elaboration of such a model might serve other goals as well. The model
might illuminate aspects of legislation and case law that would otherwise go
unnoticed. It might facilitate the development of a coherent and consistent family
policy. It might also clarify-and build-social consensus on appropriate familial
behavior; the law has, to use Carl Schneider's evocative phrase, a "channelling effect"
that may reinforce or undermine prevailing ideology.63 But if legal norms are unclear,
their capacity to influence opinion and behavior is reduced.
While desirable, the project of constructing a detailed governance model for the
contemporary family is, needless to say, a daunting project. I do not propose even to
attempt the elaboration of a full model here. But I would like to sketch one possible
approach that we might use. Even here, my thoughts are tentative and I do not claim
to have thought through all the issues that must be addressed.
II. TOWARD A MODEL OF DEMOCRATIC FAMILY
GOVERNANCE: METHODOLOGY
A. "Global" Theories of Justice as Sources
How might we develop a model of democratic family governance appropriate
for contemporary families? There are a range of approaches we might use, but
'he evidence suggests that extended reflection and debate can change individuals' views on issues
of justice. See NORMAN FROHICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING JUsTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL
APPROACHTO ETHICALTHEORY 55-66, 168-84 (1992).
'See Schneider, supra note 52, at 505-12. Mr. and Mrs. McGuire's marriage, for example, conforms
to the modified patriarchal governance model in effect at the time of the McGuire decision. According to
Mrs. McGuire, Mr. McGuire was "the boss of the house and his word was law." McGuire, 59 N.W.2d at
337. Mr. McGuire had exercised his prerogative to determine where the family should live-his farm, and
how the family should live-meagerly. He had provided support in accordance with his own priorities; for
example, he appears to have willingly paid for Mrs. McGuire's medical expenses even though he refused
to purchase a new refrigerator. Id. Mrs. McGuire also controlled her own income and capital without any
complaint on his part. Id. McGuire thus demonstrates the power of legal rules that conform to prevailing
ideology, even when those rules are not enforced through legal sanctions. See BLUMmsIN & SCHWARTZ,
supra note 55 (reporting that surveyed couples' beliefs about marriage affected the balance of power in
their relationship, with the result that the husband was more powerful when both he and the wife strongly
adhered to the "male provider" view of marriage).
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reliance on a "global" theory of distributive justice' which has as its object the
overall design of society holds a number of advantages over the alternatives. One
reason for reliance on such theories is the extensive involvement of the state in
determining family governance.' More importantly, the family is a fundamental part
of the basic structure of society;' the "little commonwealth"67 of the family serves as
both the seedbed of the larger political community and the primary sphere in which
its values are transmitted.
The distribution of power and resources within the family will also mirror and
shape those of the larger community.6" It is no accident that, in societies with a
tradition of male supremacy, families typically discriminate against their female
members. Nor is it mere chance that hierarchical societies tend toward hierarchical
families.69
Moreover, the distribution of familial power and resources will play a vital,
perhaps crucial, role in determining the status and opportunities of family members
within the larger commonwealth. If, for example, the family's male children obtain all
its educational resources and the female children none, the children's prospects
outside the family will vary dramatically. While the results of such systematic
inequalities will be most dramatic when children are involved, adult family members
are not immune from their effects.70
Finally, the family serves as one of society's primary sources of moral
education. It is in the family that we first encounter issues involving power, justice,
and the allocation of goods and responsibilities. It is here that we learn how to put
ourselves into another's place and find out what we would do in his position.7'
Because of the primacy of family life, as a determinant of social structure,
individual opportunities, and individual values, a global theory of distributive justice
is appropriate-perhaps crucial-to the formulation of a full account of family
governance. But I should note that, while the use of a global theory to generate a
governance model appears to be fully warranted and highly desirable, global theories
"The adjective is Jon Elster's. See JON ELSTER, LOCAL JUSTICE: How INSTTuTONS ALLOCATE
SCARCE GOODS AND NECESSARY BURDENS 184 (1992).
'See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
'The term is that of John Rawls. See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 462-63 (1971).
67JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOvERNMENT 341 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960).
6SSee MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 240 (1983) ("The family... reproduces the structures
of kinship in the larger world [and may] ... impose[] what we currently call 'sex roles' upon a range of
activities to which sex is entirely irrelevant.").
69See Barbara Harriss, Intrafamily Distribution of Hunger in South Asia, in 1 THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF HUNGER (J. Dreze & Amartya K. Sen eds., 1991); Hanna Papanek, To Each Less Than She
Needs, From Each More Than She Can Do: Allocations, Entitlements and Value, in PERSISTENT
INEQUALITIES: WOMEN AND WORLD DEvELOPMENT 162 (Irene Tinker ed., 1990).
'The distribution of family resources may also affect the distribution of resources within the larger
community. If parents fail to share resources with their children, for example, the community will likely
feel obliged to grant them some form of public aid. Michael Walzer thus notes that distributive justice in
the sphere of welfare and security has a two-fold meaning, referring both to the recognition of need and
to group membership. Walzer suggests that a community will not allow its members to starve and that to
identify those whose basic needs a community will meet is to identify those whom the community
identifies as members. WALZER, supra note 68, at 79.71See RAWLS, supra note 66, at 469.
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have not often been used in this manner. Although political philosophers have written
extensively about the family,72 they have tended to assume that family relationships
are governed by altruism rather than the constraints of formal justice. 3 Although this
tendency has abated in contemporary discussions of marriage,74 it is still dominant in
discussions of the parent-child tie. 5 The large contemporary literature on issues of
intergenerational justice, for example, admits the possibility of resource conflict
between the young and old as generational groups, but almost invariably assumes
parental altruism within the nuclear family.76
I do not wish to deny the role of altruism in family relationships. But altruism
is clearly an inadequate basis for understanding the relationships of separated
families,' and even intact families are often characterized by selfish rather than
altruistic behavior. This is, indeed, an important reason for family law. Moreover,
7 2For a useful summary of western philosophical writing on the family, see JEFFREY BLUSTEIN,
PARENTS AND CHILDREN: THE ETHICS OF THE FAMILY 19-98 (1982). See also JACOB JOSHUA Ross, THE
VIRTUES OF THE FAMmY 124-35 (1994).
nSee, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 10, at 141 ("[Ihe political importance of families-so obvious
and central to Plato, Rousseau, and Tocquevile-is today almost always ignored."); SUSAN M. OKIN,
JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 9 (1989) (arguing that "contemporary theories ofjustice [refuse] even
to discuss the family and its gender structure, much less to recognize the family as a political institution
of primary importance"); Stephen G. Post, Justice, Redistribution, and the Family, J. SOC. PHIL,
Fall-Winter 1990, at 91 (describing tendency of modem distributive justice theories to ignore the family);
Peter Vallentyne & Morry Lipson, Equal Opportunity and the Family, 3 PUB. AFF. Q., Oct., 1989, at 27,
37-40 (arguing incompatibility of family autonomy and liberal principle of equal opportunity).
74See OKIN, supra note 73, at 9; WAIZER, supra note 68, at 227-42; Onom O'Neill, Justice, Gender,
and International Boundaries, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 303 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds.,
1993).
75See, e.g., CHARLES FREED, RIGHT AND WRONG 155 (1978) (arguing that parenthood enlarges
"sense of autonomy... [so that] use of autonomy is the model for the deepest form of altruism");
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 91 (arguing that justice must make use of "the
natural partiality of parents for their children"); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 167
(1974) (stating that "it is not appropriate to enforce across the wider society the relationships of love and
care undertaken within a family"); RAWLS, supra note 66.
76lndeed, the probability of a parent's partiality toward his or her own offspring is often described
as a major impediment to the achievement of equality within an age cohort and between successive
generations. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 201-27 (1980);
JAMES S. FISKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY (1983); James S. Fishkin, The Limits
of Intergenerational Justice, in JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 62, 73-78 (Peter
Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds., 1993). For a general introduction to the literature on intergenerational
justice, see the various essays collected in JUSTICE ACROSS GENERATIONS: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? (Lee M.
Cohen ed., 1993); JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS, supra; and OBLIGATIONS TO
FUTURE GENERATIONS (R.I. Sikora & Brian Barry eds., 1978).
'Parents separated from their children are not only much less likely than custodial parents to support
them during their minority, but they are also less likely to share assets and income with their adult children.
See Frank F. Furstenburg et al., The Effect of Divorce on Intergenerational Transfers: New Evidence, 32
DEMOGRAPHY 319 (1995) (finding that fathers and mothers had similar rates of asset transfer to their adult
children following late divorces, while divorce during childhood years was associated with sharp decrease
in transfers by fathers and an increase in transfers by custodial mothers; fathers who paid child support
were not more likely to make intergenerational transfers); Nadine F. Marks, Midlife Marital Status
Differences in Social Support Relationships with Adult Children and Psychological Well-Being, 16 J.
FAM. ISSUES 6,14-25 (1995) (finding that, compared to first-marriage parents, remarried and single parents
generally professed less belief in parental financial obligations and were less likely to give support to their
adult children).
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while the family as a set of affective and altruistic relationships may lie beyond the
realm of justice, family law most certainly does not.
Despite its relative inattention to the family as a political institution, contempo-
rary political philosophy offers a number of global theories of distributive justice that
we might draw on in constructing a democratic model of family governance.78 Among
these, the contractarian approach is perhaps best suited to our task.
B. The Contractarian Methodology
A contractarian views society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage
among self-interested persons; a just distribution of power and resources is that
distribution to which those self-interested individuals would freely agree.7 9 The
contractarian tradition dates back to Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau, and underlies
many of our political institutions. The contractarian notion that government rests on
the consent of the governed was, of course, a central theme in the founding of the
American republic; indeed, it underlies all forms of democratic government.8" The
contractarian approach also comports with the widespread modern tendency "to
understand our legal rules as resting mainly on imputed bargains"8 and to view the
family as a voluntary association bound not just by obligations, but by ties of
inclination and affection. 2 For designing a nonpatriarchal, democratic form of family
governance, a contractarian methodology thus seems to be singularly appropriate.
A contractarian methodology is related to, but differs from, the modern tendency
to see marriage as a contract instead of a status.83 While a contaetarian account of
family governance assumes that the ultimate basis of rules governing family
relationships is the implied consent of family members, it does not require individu-
7 We could, for example, utilize a utilitarian, egalitarian, libertarian, communitarian, or feminist
account of distributive justice. For a description of the prescriptiors these various theories appear to offer
for one family law issue, child support, see Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or Community: An Evaluation of
Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CALIF. L REV. 41, 76-86 (1998).
'See, e.g., J.W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (2d ed. 1957) (surveying historical development
of social contract tradition); RAWLS, supra note 66, at 4, 13.
°See, e.g., THOMAS L PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL VISION OF
THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE passim (1988) (describing Locke's influence
upon founders of the American republic).
"'John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE LJ. 625,630 (1995).
2See, e.g., DEMOS, supra note 53, at 184 (stating "the central values attaching to domestic
experience nowadays... are those which underscore significant personal encounters"); GLENDON, supra
note 24.
83See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 131 (1989) (noting that
legal rules that require sharing of property by marital partners "[s]ometimes... are thought of as an
expression of the presumed intent of husbands and wives to pool their fortunes on an equal basis, share and
share alike"); DUKEMINIER & JOHANSEN, supra note 48, at 484 (reporting that under partnership theory
of marriage "the economic rights of each spouse are seen as deriving from an unspoken marital bargain
under which the partners agree that each is to enjoy a half interest in the fruits of the marriage"); ROBERT
E. GOODIN, PROTECriNG THE VULNERABLE: A REANALYSIS OF OUR SOCIAL REPONSIBU'ILES 72 (1985)
(noting that "[t]he received view of marriage is insistently contractual").
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ally negotiated bargains in particular family relationships;' it is the social contract
underlying status-based rules with which the contractarian methodology is
concerned.85
While the notion of a social contract dates back more than two hundred years,
the most influeniial contemporary contractarian is John Rawls. Rawls's distinctive
contribution to the classical social contract tradition was to posit a hypothetical
"original position of equality" 6 from which the contractors would choose the
principles by which society will be ordered. Rawls allows the contractors an
awareness that their society will experience "moderate scarcity," as well as knowledge
of "whatever general facts affect the[ir] choice of principles,"" including politics,
economics, social organization, and human psychology. 8 However, he denies them
knowledge of their individual abilities, status and "special psychological
propensities"89 within the society they will lay out.'
Rawls asserts that an agreement so made would be just because of its basis in
an impartial process that gives each contractor equal knowledge and power.9' He also
asserts that, under these constrained circumstances, the contractors would opt for two
principles of justice:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage; and (b) attached to positions
and offices open to all.92
While some of Rawls' critics have argued against the necessity of the original
position approach and many have criticized his conclusions about what principles of
justice the contractors would select,' 3 the claim that the approach is procedurally fair
has been well received. We might then ask what principles the contractors would
select for family governance.
Rawls, it is important to note, did not focus on the family in A Theory of Justice
except in very limited respects. He did develop at some length a theory of moral
'For arguments in favor of individual contractual ordering of marriage, see, for example, LENoRE
J. WEnZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SpousEs, LovERS, AND THE LAw (1981); Marjorie Maguire
Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L REV. 207 (1982).
8For this reason, critiques of the individual contract approach focused on its tendency to ignore the
communal aspect of family relationships are not, in my view, relevant. For such critiques, see REGAN,
supra note 52, at 118-53; Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Family as a System: A Preliminary Sketch, 1996 UTAH
L REV. 537,545-48.
8'RAwLs, supra note 66, at 12.
871d, at 137.
'SSee id.
"9d at 12.
9°See id at 11-.2, 136-50 (offering a detailed account of the original position).
9 See id. at 13-14.
921d at 60; see also id. at 151-52, 302.
93See generally READING RAWLs: CRrITCAL STUDIES OF A THEORY OFJUSICE (Norman Daniels ed.,
1976); BRIAN BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUsTIcE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPAL
DOCTRINEs IN "A THEORY OF JUsTIcE" (1973).
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development in which the parent-child relationship plays a central role;94 he also
examined in some detail the question of how much one generation should save for the
next.9' But he neatly side-stepped issues of intrafamilial justice by presuming that
persons in the original position represent family lines, with ties of sentiment between
successive generations.96
Susan Okin and other feminist critics of Rawls have ably criticized Rawls's
failure to take account of gender inequalities within the family.'c The assumption of
ties of sentiment between successive generations-particularly Rawls's use of this
assumption to generate intergenerational savings-has also been criticized by a
number of theorists.98
In more recent work, Rawls has expressed the belief that his theory is applicable
to "problems of gender and the family." Last year he offered an account of how the
theory applies. In Rawls's view, "[t]he family is part of the basic structure since one
of its main roles is to be the basis of the orderly production and reproduction of
society and its culture from one generation to the next;" thus, although "[tihe
principles of political justice are ... not to apply directly to the internal life of
the... family.... they do impose essential constraints on the family as an institu-
'Rawls notes that parents instill in the child the desire to become the sort of person that they are,
and that healthy moral development requires that
parents must love the child .... be worthy objects of his admiration... [and] enunciate clear
and intelligible (and of course justifiable) rules adapted to the child's level of comprehen-
sion.... The parents should exemplify the morality which they enjoin, and make explicit its
underlying principles as time goes on.... Presumably moral development falls to take place
to the extent that these conditions are absent, and especially if parental injunctions are not
only harsh and unjustified, but enforced by punitive and even physical sanctions.
RAWLS, supra note 66, at 465-66. This account assumes that the family serves as an agent ofjustice, and
thus does not, as have some other political philosophers, place the family outside the realm of formal
justices
"Because he assumes that everyone in the original position will be in the same generation, Rawls
is forced to assume altruism between generations in order to generate savings at all:
[They try to piece together ajust savings schedule by balancing how much at each stage they
would be willing to save for their immediate descendants against what they would feel
entitled to claim of their immediate predecessors. Thus imagining themselves to be fathers,
say, they are to ascertain how much they should set aside for their sons by noting what they
would believe themselves entitled to claim of their fathers.
Id. at 289-90.
9'See id at 128-29 (stating that "we may think of the parties as heads of families, and therefore as
having a desire to further the welfare of their nearest descendants").
'See OKIN , supra note 73, at 95-96, 101-09; see also Linda R. Hirsnhman, Is the Original Position
Inherently Male-Superior?, 94 COLUM. L REV. 1860 (1994); Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man"
Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L REV. 1171 (1992).
"In A Theory of Justice Rawls describes the contractors as "represent[ing] family lines, with ties
of sentiment between successive generations." RAWLS, supra note 66, at 128-29, 146. Rawls uses the
assumption of ties of sentiment to derive a "just savings schedule." In Rawls's view, the contractors would
derive such a schedule by "balancing how much at each stage they would be willing to save for their
immediate descendants against what they would feel entitled to claim of their immediate predecesors." Id.
at 289. For representative critiques of Rawls's approach to intergenerational savings, see, for example,
BRUCE ACKERMAN, supra note 76, at 222-25; Kenneth Arrow, Rawls' Principle of Just Savings, 75
SWEDISH J. ECON. 323 (1973); R.M. Hare, Rawls' Theory of Justice, in Reading Rawls, supra note 93, at
81,97-10.
99JOHN RAWLS, POLrrICAL LIBERALISM xxix (1993).
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tion. ' 'Itu Rawls appears to see economic inequalities occasioned by familial
dissolution as a problem subject to constraint, as he notes that "[it seems intolerably
unjust that a husband may depart the family taking his earning power with him and
leaving his wife and children far less advantaged than before ... A society that
permits this does not care about women, much less about their equality, or even about
their children, who are its future."'10'
But issues ofjustice within the family, according to Rawls, are not to be decided
on the basis of those principles applicable to society as a whole:
As citizens we have reasons to impose the constraints specified by the political
principles of justice on associations; while as members of associations we have
reasons for limiting those constraints so that they leave room for a free and
flourishing internal life appropriate to the association in question. Here again we
see the need for the division of labor between different kinds of principles. We
wouldn't want political principles of justice-including principles of distributive
justice-to apply directly to the internal life of the family.1'
In this statement, Rawls seems to suggest that principles of justice should not apply
to all aspects of family life. There is certainly merit in this point of view; we do not
want to require Mom and Dad to divide every bag of jelly beans in accordance with
principles of justice. But neither, of course, do we want to require government
officials to make every decision based on principles of justice. A legislature is not
unjust because it passes the occasional "pork-barrel" bill that unfairly benefits a few
at the expense of the many any more than a family is unjust if the jelly beans are
divided unequally.
What Rawls fails to discuss is the possibility of using principles of justice to
formulate a basic governmental structure for the family, still leaving room for a "free
and flourishing internal life." But the original position postulated by Rawls as a
heuristic device is easily amended to accomplish this purpose. All we need do-as
Okin and other feminist critics of Rawls have noted-is revise the original position
scenario so that the contractors are self-interested individuals rather than altruistic
family heads. 3 Family life, gender, and the parent-child relationship then come
squarely into focus.
"°°John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CH. L REv. 765,789 (1997); see also
id. at 790-91 ("[W]e are not required to treat our children in accordance with political principles.... [T]he
principles of justice impose constraints on the family on behalf of children who as society's future citizens
have basic rights as such."); RAWLS, supra note 66, at 7 (describing "monogamous family" as part of major
social institution).
...Rawls, supra note 100, at 793.
1021d. at 790.
'
03Rawls himself provides that the contractors will "not know to which generation they [will]
belong," RAWLS supra note 66, at 287, and "[a]mong the essential features of this situation is that no one
knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like .... The principles of
justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance." Id. at 12.
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C. A Contractarian Methodology Applied to Family Governance
In the original position so amended, we can feel confident that the contractors
would be concerned with issues of intrafamilial justice; knowing that the family has
traditionally been a primary source of individual opportunity, status, and values,104
self-interest will mandate attention to issues of justice among family members. Even
if the contractors were willing to put aside their personal interests in ensuring just
family governance, the public consequences of failure to live up to Rawls's
assumption of altruism and justice would require their attention.
Theoretically, of course, the contractors might decide that the new society would
do without families; 5 abolition of the family would ensure that issues of intrafamilial
justice simply did not arise. But given their access to facts drawn from economics,
psychology, and social organization, the contractors will know that the family, in one
form or another, has been ubiquitous in human society and that it has served as both
the prime agent of child rearing and the principal unit of economic organization.106
They will also know that familial ties-of parent to child, wife to husband, brother
to sister-have traditionally been the focus of most individuals' emotional lives. For
all these reasons, it seems unlikely that our contractors would choose a society in
which families do not exist.1°7
What would the contractors conclude with respect to family governance? In
considering this question, it is important to keep in mind that the contractors act from
self-interest. They are limited, however, in that they do not know what their real-life
situation will be within the new society they are ordering. Because of this "veil of
ignorance," they are "force[d] ... to take the good of others into account."" Because
they might be a husband, a wife, and a parent, they must consider the needs and
interests of each. Because they do not know their gender, earning potential, or
preferences for paid and household employment, they must take into account the
interests of highly paid earners and homemakers, of both sexes.
Even without a veil of ignorance, the contractors should be deeply concerned
with the position of children; indeed, one of the advantages of the Rawlsian
methodology is that it lends itself so well to the inclusion of children within the
governance model. Children's interests will be a prime concern to the contractors
because of one simple fact: While half, more or less, will belong to each sex and
'
04See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
'°sJOHN RAWLS, PoLmcAL LIBERALISM xxix (1993).
'6John Rawis, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L REv. 765, 789 (1997); see also
id. at 790-91 ("[W]e are not required to treat our children in accordance with political principles.... [Tihe
principles of justice impose constraints on the family on behalf of children who as society's future citizens
have basic rights as such."); RAWLS, supra note 66, at 7 (describing "monogamous family" as part of major
social institution).
'How would the family be defined? Here human societies have been far more various in their
approaches. See, e.g., MEAD, supra note 104, at 191 ("which women and which children are provided for
is entirely a matter of social arrangements"). Would the contractors recognize cohabitants as families? How
would they define parentage? These are important questions, given that the definition of the family unit
will determine the group to whom the governance structure applies.
1
'08d. at 790.
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many will become parents, every single one will be a child. Given the contractors'
access to an empirical data base containing information drawn from psychology and
sociology, they will also know that family relationships"m and childhood experience"'
play a powerful role in shaping adult prospects. Both self-interest and the contractors'
concerns as public citizens.. should thus lead them to insist on governance principles
that will ensure each child a fair opportunity of attaining a fruitful, self-selected
adulthood; the structure of family governance, I would expect, will thus be more
"child-centered" than has been traditional in our own society. The contractors will
likely adopt a child-centered approach to parental rights"' rather than one that
emphasizes parental autonomy."' Certainly parental prerogatives-with respect to
child care and discipline, education, medical care-would be limited as necessary to
ensure children a full range of adult choices; the deference to parents' educational
values found in Wisconsin v. Yoder,"4 for example, would not likely be favored.
10For representative examples of the literature, see, for example, JOHN BowLBY, A SECURE BASE:
PARENT-CHILD ATTACHMENT AND HEALTHY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1988); MARGARET S. MAHLER ET
AL., THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BIRTH OF THE HUMAN INFANT (1975); SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATIONS OF
DEvELOPmENTALPsYCMATRY (Michael C. Rutter ed., 1980); CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ArACHMENT
(Jay Belsky & Teresa M. Nezworski eds., 1988); Glen H. Elder et al., Problem Behavior and Family
Relationships: Life Course and Intergenerational Themes in HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE LE
COURSE: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 293 (Aage B. Sorensen et al. eds., 1986); Seymour Epstein,
The Self-Concept: A Review of the Proposal of an Integrated Theory of Personality, in PERSONALITY:
BASIC ISSUES AND CURRENT RESEARCH (Ervin Staub ed., 1980).
"'For example, children who reside in a single-parent households are more likely to experience poor
health, behavioral problems, delinquency, and low educational attainment than are their peers in intact
families; as adults they have higher rates of poverty, early childbearing, and divorce. For summaries of the
research, see DONALD J. HERNANDEZ, AMERICA'S CHILDREN: RESOURCES FROM FAMILY GOVERMNENT,
AND THE ECONOMY 58-64 (1993); S. Wayne Duncan, Economic Impact of Divorce on Children's
Development: Current Findings and Policy Implications, 23 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 444 (1994);
Sara McLanahan, Intergenerational Consequences of'Divorce: The United States Perspective, in
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 285 (Lenore J. Weitzman &
Mavis Maclean eds., 1992); Sara S. McLanahan et al., The Role of Mother-Only Families in Reproducing
Poverty, in CHILDREN OF POVERTY: CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 51 (Aletha C. Huston ed.,
1991).
"'the public costs of adverse childhood experience are high. Children in foster care, for example,
which costs the taxpayer $15,000 to $30,000 per child per year, are overwhelmingly from fractured,
impoverished homes. See DUNCAN LINDSAY, THE WELFARE OF CHLDREN 140, 149-53 (1994); MARK F.
TESTA & ROBERT M. GEORGE, POLICY AND RESOURCE FACTORS IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PERMANENCY
FOR FOSTER CHILDREN IN ILLINOIS (1988). Nor are the public costs of adverse childhood experience short-
term. Failure to complete high school has alone been estimated to cost $250 billion in lower wages and
forgone tax payments over the lifetime of each class of dropouts. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN,
BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEw AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 12-13 (1991).
"'For descriptions of and commentary on this approach, see, for example, Bartlett, Parenthood,
supra note 15, at 294-95; James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CALIF. L REV. 1371, 1374 (1994); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott,
Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L REV. 2401, 2405-14 (1995); Woodhouse, supra note 15, at 1827-44;
John Bigelow et al., ParentalAutonomy, 5 J. APP. PHIL. 183 (1988).
"'Foran example of a parent-focused approach, see FRIED, supra note 75, at 152 (arguing that "the
right to form one's child's values, one's child's life plan and the right to lavish attention on that child
[are] ... extensions of the basic right not to be interfered with in doing these things for oneself").
'406 U.S. 205 (1972) (reversing parental convictions under compulsory school attendance law due
to laws interference with defendants' free exercise and parental rights).
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The contractors should also be concerned with children's economic entitlements.
Family dissolution and nonsupport are currently major causes of children's poverty,
welfare dependence and a range of other adverse consequence that may extend into
adulthood." 5 While these outcomes do not result solely from reduced economic
status, this factor appears to be the most important of the identifiable causes." 6 With
this information in hand, I expect that the contractors would be extremely interested
in child support.
Traditionally, child support law-like the spousal support rule on which Mrs.
McGuire relied-has assumed parental income to be the property of the individual
parent rather than the family unit."' I doubt that our selfish contractors, either as
prospective children or public citizens, would approve this approach. Nor is such an
approach consistent with the family's role in inculcating empathy and a sense of
justice."8 Of course, the contractors would also want their needs as potential support
obligors to be taken into account; but future status as a support obligor is uncertain
and should lead the contractors to favor equality among family members, rather than
a rule preferring the noncustodial parent's interests to those of his child.
Putting these various concerns together, Rawl's conclusion that the contractors
would select a "maximin" approach to the distribution of social resources," 9
permitting inequalities only to the extent that they benefit the least advantaged group,
seems to be equally applicable to the problem of child support.1 2o The maximin
"sSee, e.g., Mary Jo Bane, Household Composition and Poverty, in FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT
WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 209, 231 (Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel H. Weinberg eds., 1986)
(concluding that "perhaps about 15 percent of all poverty could be alleviated by more attention to the
allocation of resources after household splits"); Greg J. Duncan & Willard L. Rodgers, Longitudinal
Aspects of Children's Poverty, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1007, 1017 tbl. 5 (1988) (concluding that 14.9%
of children's transitions into poverty resulted from loss of a parent from the home); see also Peter J. Leahy
et al., Time on Welfare: Why Do People Enter and Leave the System, 54 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 33 (1995)
(reporting change in family structure as primary reason women enter welfare system).
"
6See, e.g., SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP wrTH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT
HURTS, WHAT HELPS 3, 79-94 (1994) ("Low income-and the sudden drop in income that often is
associated with divorce-is the single most important factor in children's lower achievement in single-
parent homes, accounting for about half of the disadvantage."); McLanahan, supra note 110, at 292-93,
298 (summarizing studies and concluding that "income explains more than half of the.... [child outcome]
variation across family types"); see also Duncan, supra note 110 (reviewing research).
'"See Garrison, supra note 78.
118As public citizens concerned about public expenditure, the contractors should also prefer a rule
that requires parents, rather than the public, to provide for children's needs when possible.
bThe shorthand description is Rawls's. See RAWL.S, supra note 66, at 152.
"°Rawls's conclusion that rational contractors would select a maximin approach is not uncontrover-
sial. See John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a BasisforMorality? A Critique of John
Rawls's Theory, 69 AM. POL SCL REV. 594, 600-01 (1975) (concluding that contractors would opt for
principle of average utility); Roger E. Howe & Jon E. Roemer, Rawlsian Justice as the Core of a Game,
71 AM. ECON. REv. 880 (1981) (concluding that contractors exhibiting moderate degree of risk aversion
would opt for unconstrained income maximization with floor constraint); see also DAVID GAUTHIER,
MORALS BY AGREEMENT 14, 235, 264-65 (1986) (arguing that rational contractor would opt for Lockean
proviso (principle that one must not better one's own situation through interaction that worsens the
situation of another), the market, and a principle of "minimax relative concession," requiring that the
greatest bargaining concession, measured as a proportion of the difference between the least the conceder
might accept in place of no agreement and the most he might receive in place of being excluded by others
from agreement, be as small as possible). But this controversy appears to be largely insignificant for
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approach would yield something like an "equal outcomes" child support
model-which aims at providing equal living standards for both portions of the
separated family"'-with income maximization incentives.'2 Certainly the
contractors would forbid the "self-support reserve" feature of many current support
guidelines, that-generally without regard to the child's or custodial parent's standard
of living-permits (or requires) the court to award less child support when the support
obligor's income falls below a statutorily defined limit (typically the federal poverty
line);"u such an approach clearly does not give equal regard to the claims of all family
members. It is also possible that our selfish contractors would grant children an
inheritance entitlement, at least when the other parent is not the primary distributee.' 2
What about marriage and divorce? Certainly the contractors would insist on
formal gender equality; approximately 50% of them, after all, will belong to each sex.
Gender neutrality-in economic entitlements and obligations, decision making
powers, custody rights-would seem to follow. Assuming, with Rawls, that "the most
purposes of child support policy. See Garrison, supra note 78.
'For descriptions of the equal outcomes model, see Judith Cassetty et al., The ELS (Equal Living
Standards) Modelfor Child Support Awards, in ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELJNES DEvELOP-
MENT: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND PoLIcy CONSIDERATIONS 329 (1987) [hereinafter ESSENTIALS OF CHILD
SUPPORT]; Philip Eden et al., In the Best Interest of Children: A Simplified Model for Equalizing the
Living Standards of Parental Households, in ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT, supra, at 353; Isabel V.
Sawhill, Developing Normative Standards for Child-Support Payments, in THE PARENTAL CHIID-SUPPORT
OBUGATION 79 (Judith Cassetty ed., 1983).
This follows from the maximin principle itself, which sanctions income inequality benefitting the
least advantaged group. Accordingly, inequality that could reliably be predicted to raise the living standard
of both segments of the divided family would be preferred to pure equality. Such an effect might arise
from an educational program or career shift that reduced current income but would likely produce a large
gain in future income. But the most important reason for permitting income inequality is the problem of
work (dis)incentives. The work incentives problem derives from the fact that, if each parent stands to lose
a large portion of the benefit from new income-a result that the pure equal outcomes model logically
requires-each parent's incentive to produce more income is markedly reduced. The maximin formula
would sanction (indeed, require) modification of a pure equal outcomes model to create the work incentives
needed to maximize aggregate family income. A number of commentators have rejected the equal
outcomes approach because of its potential to create significant work disincentives. See Barbara
Bergmann, Setting Appropriate Levels of Child-Support Payments, in THE PARENTAL CHILD SUPPORT
OBLIGATION, supra note 121 at 116-17; Marilyn R. Smith & Jon Laramore, Massachusetts' Child Support
Guidelines: A Modelfor Development, in ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 12, at 273 (same).
'Both the "income shares" and Melson formulae include a self-support reserve feature; one or
another of these formulae are in use in more than 30 states. See Robert G. Williams, Guidelines for Setting
Levels of Child Support, 21 FAM. LQ. 281, 305 tbl. 4 (1987); see also DIANE DODSON & JOAN
ENTMACHER, REPORT CARD ON STATE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 49-55 (1994) (describing and
categorizing state rules). The Massachusetts and D.C. guidelines provide a self-support reserve for the
custodial parent. See id. at 54.
t
"Louisiana is currently the only American state to grant children an inheritance entitlement, see
DUKmINIER & JOHANSEN, supra note 48, at 550, although recent scholarly commentary is critical of this
approach. See Deborah A. Batts, I Didn't Ask to Be Born: The American System of Disinheritance and a
Proposalfor Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HAST. UJ. 1197 (1990); Ralph C. Brashier,
Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L REv. 83 (1994). Under the maximum
principle, it would be necessary to limit inheritance rights so that "resulting inequalities are to the
advantage of the least fortunate and compatible with liberty and fair equality of opportunity." RAWIs,
supra note 66, at 277-78; see also ACKERMAN, supra note 76, at 202-08 (analyzing issue of inheritance
in liberal state).
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extensive liberty compatible with equal liberty for all"'" would serve as one of the
contractors' guiding principles, they should also prefer no-fault divorce to a restrictive
divorce regime. Because of their relatively child-centered approach, the contractors
might opt for more limited divorce grounds if a benefit to the couple's minor children
could be shown. But the evidence on this point is in fact equivocal. Children in single-
parent households are more likely to experience poor health, behavioral problems,
delinquency, and low educational attainment than are their peers in intact families; as
adults they have higher rates of poverty, early childbearing, and divorce.126 But
because the most significant factor in producing these poor outcomes is reduced
economic status accompanying parental separation, 27 the new contractarian child
support model might be expected to ameliorate them. And parental conflict within an
intact family is also harmful to children. 28 Another problem here is simply that
divorce law can only affect the legal termination of a marital relationship; even if the
new divorce law could prevent spousal collusion in obtaining a divorce, 129 it cannot
prevent consensual separation or nonconsensual desertion. Thus, without a clear basis
for limiting adult family members' ability to exit an unwanted relationship, no-fault
divorce would probably be applied across the board.
With respect to marital economic entitlements, our selfish contractors will want
to maximize their own holdings. But they do not know whether they individually will
acquire few assets or many; nor do they know whether they will disproportionately
engage in unpaid childcare and household labor that benefits the family unit but limits
individual asset acquisition. The contractors' child-centered perspective should also
incline them toward a rule that does not discourage child care by parents. Given that
the connection between child care/household production and the acquisition of
assets/income would be confined to what we today think of as "marital" or "commu-
nity" property,"3 the likely result of the contractors' deliberations would be rejection
'sRAWVLS, supra note 66, at 60.
" See sources cited supra note 115.
7See supra notes 115-16, and sources cited therein.
128See, e.g., WAUERrSThN & KELLY, 49, 70-71 (reporting that children experience loyalty conflict
and unhappiness as result of parental discord); Jay Belsky et al., Patterns of Marital Change and Parent-
Child Interaction, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 487, 496 (1991) (reporting that quality of father-child
relationship is frequently correlated with quality of father-mother relationship); E. Mavis Hetherington et
al., Play and Social Interaction in Children Following Divorce, 35 J. Soc. IssuEs 26 (1979) (discussing
adverse effects of divorce on child's play); Janet R. Johnston, Children's Adjustment in Sole Custody
Compared to Joint Custody Families and Principles for Custody Decision Making, 33 FAM. &
CONCILIATION COURTS REV. 415, 420-21 (1995) (reviewing research and concluding that "ongoing and
unresolved conflict between divorced parents has detrimental effects on children, especially boys," and that
in these cases substantial access to both parents is associated with poorer adjustment); James L Peterson
& Nicholas Zill, Marital Disruption, Parent-Child Relationships, and Behavior Problems in Children, 48
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 295 (1986) (discussing correlations between parents' post-divorce relationship and
children's behavior); Marsha Kline et al., The Long Shadow of Marital Conflict: A Model of Children's
Postdivorce Adjustment, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 297,305 (1991) (discussing negative effects of parental
conflict on children's post-divorce adjustment).
'29See supra note 11.
"WVlhile marital and community property regimes differ in their details, all treat property acquired
during marriage through the effort or wages of one spouse as the property of both spouses. Unlike
community property regimes, a marital property system creates entitlements only when the marriage
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of a title-based approach to property ownership in favor of a community or marital
property regime.
Would the contractors opt for title-based, joint, or equal management of marital
assets? Under the first option, the owner would have exclusive rights to use and
manage the assets he or she "owns"; under the second approach, either spouse could
use or manage community assets, without regard to title; under the final option,
neither spouse could use or manage a community asset without the consent of the
other. The management question brings us back to McGuire, although it is important
to note that the management right Mrs. McGuire might assert under the new
governance scheme differs from the support claim on which she actually relied.
We know that the contractors will want to maximize their holdings; we can also
be confident that they would insist on a management principle that is gender neutral.
But title-based, equal, and joint decision making all satisfy the gender-neutrality
requirement; and, depending on which background risks and uncertainties one
focuses, it is possible to make an asset-maximization case for each principle.
Uncertainty about the extent of the contractors' individual acquisitions suggests a
preference for equal or joint management. But uncertainty about their own and their
future spouses' relative prudence or profligacy argues in favor of joint decision
making. And the contractors' general preference for liberty suggests a preference for
equal or title-based management. Given the lack of an obvious choice among
management principles, the contractors should turn to their empirical data base for
assistance in making a selection.
That data base would reveal, first of all, that financial control within marriage
is typically determined by monetary contribution more than legal entitlement.
Blumstein and Schwartz, who undertook a pioneering study of American couples
during the early 80s, reported that three-quarters of time, it was money that
established the balance of power in a relationship. Among both married couples and
heterosexual cohabitants, women gained power when they earned more.13 1
The data base would also reveal that management of the family's day-to-day
expenditures must be distinguished from management of the family's capital.
Patriarchal family governance has typically been coupled with male control of capital
terminates through divorce. For an overview of community property law, see ROBERT L MENNELL &
THOMAS M. BOYKOFF, COMMUNrrY PROPERTY (1988). For an overview of marital property, see OLDHAM,
supra note 58. If it could be shown that asset control tended to enhance asset production (I am skeptical
that this could be shown in a familial context), then the maximin principle would suggest a more complex
system in which the asset producing spouse obtains a larger fraction of the property he or she has brought
into the marriage.
IMBLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 55, at 53-54, 309 ("Women who can support themselves
can afford to have higher expectations for their marriages beyond financial security, and because they are
more self-sufficient, they can leave if these are not met."); see also MAVIS MACLEAN, SURVIVING DIVORCE:
WOMEN'S RESOURCES AFTER SEPARATION 21-22 (1991) (summarizing several research reports); JAN
PAHL, MONEY AND MARRIAGE 169 (1989) (reporting that English husbands' greater earning power
"continues to be associated with greater control over finances and greater power in decision making");
Burgoyne & Lewis, supra note 55 (reporting results of research showing that "inequality between spouses
is still commonplace, with the husband more likely to have overall financial control and greater access to
money for personal spending").
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and female control of the day-to-day budget;13 researchers have also reported an
inverse relationship between the value of household income and the proportion
managed by the wife.' 33
To flesh out these data, consider the case of Mr. Yoshida, described in the New
York Times in an article recounting, in its author's words, "the contradiction between
[Japanese women's] public powerlessness and private [familial] authority."'"
According to the Times account, Mrs. Yoshida told the reporter that her husband was
capable of putting on his own underwear after stepping out of the bath -but no
more. 135 Each day she picked out his clothes and "help[ed] him to put his shirt and
trousers on as if he were a small child."'36 To the Times reporter, Mr. Yoshida's
inability to get himself dressed in the morning represented a form of powerlessness;
Mrs. Yoshida was the powerful parent, Mr. Yoshida the small child. We can question
this interpretation; after all, Louis XIV did not dress himself in the morning either.
But Mrs. Yoshida did clearly derive some power from her management of the
household finances. While the Japanese wife is still legally prohibited from using a
different surname from that of her husband and frequently walks behind him in public
as a means of showing respect, she also typically keeps the household books and
doles out an allowance to her husband. 7 One survey a few years ago apparently
found that half of Japanese men were dissatisfied with the size of their allowances
and that some have to plead with their wives for an advance.s' Post offices, which
serve as savings banks in Japan, typically refuse to allow withdrawals by a husband
'
3 Researhers have reported female management of the day to day budget among peasants and small
farmers in preindustrial England and France. See ROBERT W. MALCOLMSON, LUFE AND LABOUR IN
ENGLAND: 1700-1780 (1981); MARTINE SEGALEN, LOVE AND POWER IN THE PEASANT FAMILY: RURAL
FRANCE IN THE NINEIEEN H CENTURY (1983); KEIrH WRIGHTsON, ENGUSH SOCIETY: 1580-1680 (1982);
DAVID VINCENT, BREAD, KNOWLEDGE, AND FREEDOM (1981); Joan M. Jensen, Cloth, Butter and
Boarders: Women's Household Production for the Market, 12 REV. RADICAL POL ECON. 14 (1980). The
net effect, according to one expert, "was to produce an economy in which typically women and children
provided for daily living expenses on a cash basis, while the men handled the stock or field crops and used
the income from that source to pay bills for rent, replacement stock, farm labor and so on... " PAHL, supra
note 131, at 33; see also id. at 29, 41.
The same pattern has been reported among industrial workers at the turn of the century, and in
modem post-industrial societies ranging from the Britain and the United States to Japan. See Ellen Ross,
Survival Networks: Women's Neighbourhood Sharing in London Before World War 1, 15 HIST.
WORKSHOPJ. 4 (1983); Kate Mourby, The Wives and Children of the Teeside Unemployed 1919-39, 11
ORAL HISr. J. 56 (1983); A. John, Scratching the Surface: Women; Work and Coal Mining in England and
Wales, 10 ORALHIST. J. 13 (1982); BLUMsThiN & ScHwARrz, supra note 55; LILAN B. RUBIN, FAMILIES
ON THE FAULT LINE 89 (1994) (noting that, among American working-class families, "even in families
where husbands now share many of the tasks, their wives still bear full responsibility for the organization
of family life").
'
33See PAHL, supra note 131, at 29, 33, 39-42 (stating that "the more resources a household owned,
the more likely it was that the control would be in male hands").
"
5 Nicholas D. Kristof, Japan Is a Woman's World Once the Front Door Is Shut, N.Y. TIMES, June
19,1996, at Al.
'
35See id.
13Id.
'3See id.
138See id.
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without his wife's approval.'39 And, while cash machines might undermine the
financial authority of wives, many apparently refuse to give their husbands a cash
card for the family account."4° The upshot of all this is that, for every Mrs. McGuire
who might want a forum under our new governance scheme to litigate the issue of
expenditure of marital funds for a capital purchase like a refrigerator, there may also
be a Mr. Yoshida, who wants a larger beer and cigarette allowance from the basic
household budget controlled by his wife.
What would our contractors do with all of this information? Certainly the result
is not crystal clear. But I suspect that, in the end, the contractors would opt for a joint
decision making principle for major economic decisions and an equal decision making
principle for others.' 4 ' This approach offers a reasonable level of self-protection to
both the titled and nontitled spouse; it is democratic and egalitarian; it strikes a
reasonable balance between the goals of autonomy and community; it is largely self-
enforcing; and it leaves room for a "free and flourishing" family life that is not bound
by legal rules.'42
Ironically, while this result would appear to help Mr. Yoshida, it might not help
Mrs. McGuire. Equal decision making with respect to minor financial transactions
should enable Mr. Yoshida to buy more cigarettes and beer; he will not need a forum
to litigate this issue. But, if joint decision making is applied to all "major" financial
transactions, it might well preclude Mrs. McGuire from unilaterally making a large
capital purchase such as indoor plumbing; under these circumstances, a forum to
litigate the issue would be of no use to her. Defining "major" to mean only the most
significant transactions-for example, those involving a real estate transac-
tion-would help Mrs. McGuire. 43 But it would necessarily open the door to
financial mismanagement and dissipation by imprudent spouses. In the end, the choice
of a management principle thus appears to hinge on how one balances the practical
'
39See id.
1401d.
"'Community property regimes in the United States are not uniform in their treatment of property
management, but most mandate spousal agreement for some major transactions involving community
assets. See ARJZ. REv. STAT. 25-214(c) (1991) (either spouse may manage community property, but
joinder is required for transactions involving real property or a transaction of guaranty, indemnity, or
suretyship); CAL. FAM. CODE 1102 (1994) (both spouses mustjoin in community real estate transactions);
see also MENNELL & BOYKOFF, supra note 128; Carol S. Bruch, Protecting the Rights of Spouses in Intact
Marriages: The 1987 California Community Property Reform and Why It Was So Hard to Get, 1990 Wis.
L REv. 731.
"
2It would logically be coupled with a judicial forum for relief, in the form of an accounting or an
access order, for cases in which self-enforcement did not provide adequate protection of a spouse's
interests. See Bruch, supra note 141, at 751-52 (describing provisions of Uniform Marital Property Act
and California law authorizing enforcement by court order of requested accounting of ownership, beneficial
enjoyment, access, or classification of marital property).
"'Some community property states do restrict joint decision making to real estate transactions. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-214 (1991) (spouses have equal management rights with respect to community
assets, except that "joinder of both spouses is required [for] ... [a]ny transaction for the acquisition,
disposition or encumbrance of an interest in real property other than an unpatented mining claim or a lease
of less than one year [and] ... [any transaction of guaranty, indemnity or suretyship").
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problems inherent in joint and equal management rather than basic "constitutional"
constraints.'"
I have pursued this issue at some length because it shows both the strengths and
weaknesses of the contractarian methodology. The method provides some clear basic
principles and makes use of empirical data. These are both significant advantages.
The method's empirical bent is particularly important given family law's frequent
reliance on social science data; I doubt that any methodology which ignored our
accumulated knowledge about family life would be a useful means of constructing a
model of family governance. But the contractarian methodology's desirable sensitivity
to empirical data will sometimes produce uncertain results when the data is
unavailable. Nor does the contractarian approach always offer bright-line demarca-
tion of the line between basic structure and nonstructural issues. Finally, it does not
obviate the need to exercise "fair judgment, always keeping in mind the fact that we
endeavor to make a rule in each case that will be practical and in keeping with the
general understanding of mankind."'45
It is ironic that McGuire, the case with which we began our search for a fuller
model of family governance, is difficult to clearly resolve even with that model in
hand. It is possible, of course, that the new egalitarianism would influence behavior
within the McGuire household without the need for legal sanctions.'" But the
contractarian methodology's inability to clearly resolve McGuire is nonetheless a
weakness. Nor is McGuire unique. Child custody law, for example, is another area
in which the contractarian approach does not appear to produce a certain outcome.
Given the lack of clear benefits from any particular custody standard,147 it is unlikely
that the contractors would choose any custody rule, other than specifying formal
gender equality.
The failure of a contractarian methodology to resolve every issue of family law
does not, however, negate its value. Indeed, the incapacity of the model to resolve
every issue may shed light on which issues are truly foundational. The model's
reliance on empirical data may also help to build a family law research agenda. The
contractarian methodology does not resolve every problem; it is not the only method
which is useful. But it is nonetheless a provocative methodology that offers useful
insights into both family governance and family law.
'"It is perhaps for this reason that there is considerable variation in the management rules of the
various community property states. See J. Thomas Oldham, Management of the Community Estate During
an Intact Marriage, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 99, 106-07 (1993) (categorizing state regimes and
describing pros and cons of various management principles).
'
45Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
'4See supra note 63 and sources cited therein.
'
4 1For evaluations of different custody standards, see David L Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive
Rulesfor Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L REV. 477 (1984); Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules,
and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-interest Standard, 89 MICH. L REv. 2214 (1991); Robert
Mnookin Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1975, at 226; Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of
the Child, 54 U. Cm. L. REV 1 (1987).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Families have governments; family governments are characterized by a
significant level of state involvement; state prescriptions for family governance are
embodied in family law, which lays out a kind of "constitution" describing the powers
of family authorities and a "Bill of Rights" for family members. An awareness of this
underlying governance scheme is useful because it can illuminate linkages between
seemingly disparate areas of law; it can also provide a basis for evaluating specific
legislative enactments and judicial pronouncements. But given the rapidity with which
family law has moved toward an egalitarian, democratic model of family governance,
the model embedded in current family law contains a significant number of gaps and
inconsistencies.
A contractarian approach is an appropriate method of fleshing out a democratic
governance model. It is highly compatible with our current tendency to view the
family as a fluid set of relationships based on voluntary association as well as on
status. It brings children to the bargaining table, without issues relating to their
capacity. It permits us to rely on accumulated knowledge from other fields. It forces
us to imagine, quite vividly, what it would be like to be those we are not. By focusing
on the self-interested decisions of autonomous individuals it avoids inconclusive
debate over slogans. It offers a well-developed and still vital tradition that underlies
many of our political and social institutions. With these many virtues, the
contractarian approach offers a useful and provocative method for developing a
democratic, egalitarian model of family governance.

